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This  paper  contributes  to  the  established  literature  both  on  the  side  of  fiscal 
consolidation (for e.g. Alesina and Perotti 1995; Alesina et al. 2010) and that of aid supplies 
(for e.g. Mosley 1985; Faini, 2006) by investigating the effects of fiscal episodes in OECD 
donor countries on their aid effort vis-à-vis the developing countries. We use descriptive 
statistics provided by Alesina and Ardagna (2010) on episodes of fiscal consolidation and 
stimuli  in  OECD  countries  and  regression  models  to  perform  this  analysis.  The  study  is 
performed on a sample of 19 OECD DAC countries as well as on sub-samples for robustness 
check and over the period 1970-2007. Overall, the results suggest that the episodes of fiscal 
consolidation and the size of these fiscal austerity policies in OECD DAC countries lead to the 
curtailment  of  aid  effort.  Whilst  during  periods  of  fiscal  expansion,  aid  expenditures 
increase, the size of these fiscal expansion policies may have an opposite effect.  
The fiscal austerity measures currently adopted by OECD DAC countries are likely to 
result in aid shortfalls to developing countries, with these effects likely be higher in the 
“Like-minded Donor countries”.  
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1.  Introduction 
In response to the largest post-war recession, OECD governments have run up record 
peacetime  budget  deficits.  The  recent  financial  crisis  has  constrained  them  to  embark  on 
major  fiscal  stimulus  in  order  to  rescue  their  financial  institutions  and  the  ensuing  Great 
Recession. As a result, budget deficits and government debt soared, leading to a substantial 
deterioration of their fiscal situations.  
Actions to design and implement “exits” from fiscal stimulus become imperative and 
prompt countries to adopt fiscal consolidation measures in order to make their public finances 
sustainable. Furthermore, population ageing could create on the medium to long-run pressures 
on public finances that adds to the fiscal consolidation effort.  
 While there is an ongoing debate about the best balance between cuts in expenditure 
and rises in tax during episodes of fiscal consolidation, several empirical studies (Alesina and 
Perotti (1995, 1997a, 1998), McDermott and Wescott (1996), IMF (1996), OECD (1997) and 
Perotti (1997), Alesina and Ardagna 1998, Ardagna 2007, Alesina and Ardagna 2010, IMF 
2010) tend to convey the same message: “fiscal adjustments which rely primarily on spending 
cuts on transfers and the government wage bill have a better chance of being successful and 
are expansionary. By contrast, fiscal adjustments which rely primarily on tax increases and 
cuts  in  public  investment  tend  not  to  last  and  are  contractionary”.  However,  Heylen  and 
Everaert  (2000)  empirically  contest  the  result  according  to  which  current  expenditures 
reductions are the best policy to get a successful fiscal consolidation. 
On the side of fiscal expansions, Alesina and Perotti (1995a) find evidence that fiscal 
expansions  typically  occur  through  increases  in  expenditures.  More  recently,  Alesina  and 
Ardagna (2010) also find evidence that fiscal stimuli based on tax cuts are more likely to 
increase growth than those based upon spending increases. 
In view of all these different empirical results, one can question whether fiscal episodes in 
donors’ governments do not affect aid supply. Indeed, it is likely that during fiscal consolidation 
episodes where government expenditures will likely be curtailed, development aid supplies by 
the OECD DAC countries that constitute a category of government expenditures will also be 
reduced.  Similarly,  we  can  also  expect  donors’  governments  to  increase  aid  expenditures 
during fiscal stimuli years as the other categories of government spending rise. At the same 
time, these OECD DAC countries have committed either individually or collectively (through 
international meetings) to achieve a target level of aid flows granted to developing countries,  
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commitments that have been renewed at the Gleneagles summit.  In 2010, the OECD has 
estimated that at least USD 10-15 billion must still be added to the forward spending plans if 
donors, are to meet their 2010’s commitments. However, during the same year, the OECD has 
communicated (on 14
th April 2010) that Africa will not likely receive more than the USD 11 
billion over the USD 25 billion promised at the Gleneagles summit, due to the adjustment 
measures adopted by the country members in response to the recent financial and economic 
crisis.  
The figures
1 reported in table 1 show evidence that over the period 1970-2007, on 
average, only four countries (Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark) have achieved, 
even exceed the international ODA target of 0.7% of GNI. These results suggest that several 
variables affect the decisions of donors to supply aid and may explain why many of them do 
not fulfil their ODA commitments. In this paper, we explore the role of fiscal episodes in 
explaining this phenomenon. 
As we will see later, the empirical literature has already established that recipient-
country characteristics such as income level, population, and political system (see for e.g. 
Alesina and Dollar 2000; Dollar and Levin 2006) affect aid inflows. However, the empirical 
literature on the donor-side’s determinants of aid, especially the one that focuses on the fiscal 
variables  remains  short  and  inconclusive.  For  example,  Faini  (2006)  finds  evidence  that 
higher  budget  deficit  and  higher  stock  of  public  debt  reduce  aid,  whereas  Round  and 
Odedokun (2004) and Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) find no significant relationship between 
deficits and aid provision. Moreover, none of these studies explore the effects that the fiscal 
episodes in donor countries may have on aid provision. 
In this paper, we investigate how donors behave in terms of aid supplies during the 
fiscal episodes.  In other words, we explore the effects of fiscal consolidation and stimuli 
episodes in OECD donor countries’ aid supplies, irrespective of their effect on per capita 
income and other economic and political variables. We follow the literature on fiscal episodes 
and use descriptive statistics and regression models to perform this analysis.       
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section (II), we provide a literature 
survey  on  the  topic.  We  then  explain  how  the  fiscal  episodes  in  OECD  countries  are 
determined (III). In section IV, we present our empirical model. Section V discusses the data 
                                                           
1 Figures are computed by the Author using the OECD’s Statistics on Overseas Development 
Assistance (ODA) and Gross National Income (GNI).  
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and  econometric  methodology  and  section  VI  presents  empirical  results.  The  last  section 
concludes. 
2.  Literature Review  
Several, though controversial studies have been conducted on the supply of foreign 
aid, with most of them relying on how recipients’ characteristics affect aid delivery. These 
studies examine the potential factors and motivations behind the supply of aid by answering 
questions such as: Who received aid? How much is received and for what kinds of activities? 
Many of them find evidence that donors’ political, economic and strategic interests appear to 
dominate altruistic and development-centered motivations in their foreign aid programs. For 
example, Alesina and Dollar (2000) use bilateral data on DAC countries over 1970-1994 and 
find evidence that factors such as colonial ties and strategic considerations (i.e. proxied by the 
degree  of  correlation  in  the  donor  and  recipient  countries’  voting  records  at  the  UN)  are 
among the factors that could influence the flow of bilateral aid.  
However, limited studies have dealt with the supply side determinants of aid flows 
from the donor’s perspective (that is, the determinants of “aid effort” or “aid generosity”). For 
example, the focus of these studies on how macroeconomic variables (and especially fiscal 
policy ones) can affect theoretically and empirically aid generosity remains scarce: Beenstock 
1980; Mosley 1985; Faini (2006) and more recently Sam (2011) have been the few authors 
that explore both theoretically and empirically the determinants of aid supplies. We present 
here the theoretical and empirical literature on this issue. 
2.1 The theoretical literature review on the determinants of aid supply 
Beenstock  (1980)  developed  a  statistical  model  that  sheds  light  on  the  political 
decision-making process regarding the allocation of aid by OECD countries and where the 
latter depends among others on the level of unemployment, the budget balance, the balance of 
payments, the Gross National Product, the level of population. After estimating his model on 
alternatively 8 (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, UK, US, the Netherlands and Sweden) and 
6 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, UK, US) over the period 1960-1976 (T=17 
Years),  he  finds  evidence  that  Aid  flows  are  negatively  and  significantly  affected  by  the 
unemployment level, the population level, and the net budget surplus, whereas it is positively 
affected by the balance-of-payments, the GNP, and a time trend.  
The theoretical model on Aid flows determinants developed by Mosley (1985) relies 
on the Breton (1974)’s approach to market adjustment in the case of goods provided by the  
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public sector. He treats aid as a public good for which there is a market, albeit highly an 
imperfect one.  
Assuming that aid determinants rest on a demand and a supply function of aid, he shows 
theoretically that the adjustment of the supply function to the demand function of aid leads to 
an equation where aid flows depend on the unemployment, the Government Budget deficit, 
the  aid  disbursement  of  all  OECD  countries  other  than  country  i,  the level of per capita 
income in country i in relation to per capita of other OECD countries and an Indicator of Aid 
quality.  This  equation  is  estimated  for  each  country  separately  as  well  as  on  pooled 
regression. The sample covers 9 OECD countries (Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, 
Netherlands,  Norway,  Sweden,  USA  and  U.K)  over  the  period  1961-1979.  Using  OLS 
technique  country  by  country,  he  concludes  among  other  variables  for  a  positive  and 
significant effect of the central government budget deficit on aid flows for Netherlands and 
United Kingdom, whereas the effect is mixed (either positive or negative) but not statistically 
significant for the other countries.  
Faini (2006) also explores through a theoretical model the links between fiscal policy 
in donors’countries and their aid effort. He develops a simple model and obtained that the 
OECD Donors’ aid effort depends on the budgetary conditions (the primary surplus and the 
stock of public debt), on the political orientation of the government, the output gap, and the 
one-year lagged value of the aid effort. This model is estimated with the dependent variable 
proxied alternatively by the net official ODA; the total official flows and the Roodman’s Net 
Aid transfers measure. The sample covers 15 donor countries over the period 1980-2004. The 
use of fixed-effects method leads him to conclude that an increase in the budget deficit or in 
the stock of debt leads to a severe decline of the development assistance.  
The last theoretical model is that of Sam (2011) who examines the aid expenditures 
response to banking crises in donor countries. He develops and estimates a model of long-run 
and short-run determinants of aid supply. Using the two-step of Engle and Granger’s method 
with fixed effects, he observed that bilateral aid supplies
2 are positively driven in the long-run 
by government saving and government expenditures (both in percent of GDP). Moreover, 
government spending (as a percentage of GDP) drive positively aid disbursements on the 
short-run.  
                                                           
2 Total bilateral aid is here the net bilateral aid disbursement minus debt relief which excludes 
disbursements to multilateral organizations but includes support to NGOs and international 
private organizations) over the period 1960-2009.  
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2.2 The review of the empirical literature on the determinants of aid 
generosity 
Besides the theoretical models described above, several other empirical studies have 
been conducted on this topic. 
Round and Odedokun (2004) investigating the decline in aid flows over the period 
1970-2000 on a sample of all 22 DAC countries, have looked at the determinants of gross 
disbursements of ODA loans and grants, as a proxy of aid generosity. By controlling for other 
political and non-political factors (per capita income, peer pressure, the number of checks and 
balances,  polarization  and  fractionalization  within  the  government,  a  time  trend  and  the 
political orientation) they do not find a significant effect of fiscal balance on aid effort. 
Bertoli et al. (2008) have concentrated their study on the determinants of aid effort 
(proxied by the net aid disbursements, net of debt relief, as share of GDP) for all of the 22 
OECD DAC countries over the period 1973-2002, with a particular focus on the Italian case 
for a comparison purpose. In employing fixed effects estimation technique and controlling for 
other political and non-political factors, they observe that the fiscal deficit exerts a positive 
effect on aid generosity.  
Mendoza et al. (2009) investigate in the wake of the global financial crisis whether 
economic and financial conditions are negatively linked to official development assistance 
(both bilateral ODA and total ODA) provided by the USA. Focusing on the period 1967-
2007, they show evidence that among other regressors, tax revenues do not affect significantly 
both bilateral and total US ODA.  
Dang et al. (2010) investigate the effects of banking crisis on a sample of 24 donor 
countries over the period 1977-2007. They use two indicators of aid: Net Aid disbursements 
and Net Aid Transfers and find evidence that banking crisis exert severe negative effects on 
aid supplies, with these effects diminishing over time. The lagged budget surplus/deficit (in % 
of GDP) in the donor’s countries adversely influences aid flows, suggesting that the budget 
surplus is achieved by cutting aid along with many other spending categories.  
Mold et al. (2010) also explore empirically the determinants of net bilateral ODA on a 
panel of all 22 DAC countries over the period 1960-2007. By employing the System-GMM 
estimator (Blundell and Blond, 1998) and fixed effects, they conclude that the scope for aid 
allocations are larger when fiscal circumstances allow it, and that geopolitical and political 
purposes are important in aid disbursements.   
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Chong and Gradstein (2002) examine the determinants of foreign aid with respect to 
the  donors.  Applying  both  fixed-effects  panel  data  and  Arellano-Bond  dynamic  estimator 
techniques, they conclude on a sample of 22 DAC countries over the period 1973-2002 that as 
tax revenues increase, aid effort rise. 
Other studies have focused more on the political determinants of aid supplies.  
Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) use a dynamic econometric methodology (both fixed 
effects and GMM procedure) on a panel of 17 donor’s countries over the period 1970-1997 to 
test whether the sizeable reduction in aggregate level of aid flows in the 1990’s was due to the 
end of the Cold war. As a control variable, fiscal balance appears to not exert a significant 
effect  on  aid  supplied  by  donors.  Dustin  Tingley  (2010)  has  broken  out  foreign  aid  by 
different categories (e.g., low-income versus high-income developing countries) and channels 
(bilateral versus multilateral) to examine how domestic political and economic environment 
influence the support for foreign aid.  Using two main political variables (a measure of the 
government ideological orientation and changes in welfare state institutions proxied by the 
time-varying  “generosity”  indicator  calculated  by  Scruggs  (2006)),  he  concludes  that  as 
governments become more conservative, their aid effort is likely to fall. Moreover, changes in 
welfare state institutions exert positive effects on total and multilateral aid as well as aid to 
LDC/OLIC  (Least  Developed  Countries/Other  Low-Income  Countries),  but  no  significant 
effect on LMIC/OMIC (Low-Middle Income Countries/Other Middle Income Countries). 
Overall, we can infer from this empirical literature that “the fiscal determinants of aid 
supply  contradict  one  another  sufficiently  so  that  there  is  no  trenchant  evidence  on  the 
relationship between fiscal policy and aid flows”.   
Our purpose in the following sections is to understand how fiscal variables, especially 
fiscal episodes, namely fiscal consolidation and fiscal stimuli episodes as well as their size in 
donor countries affect the aid expenditures toward developing countries. The next section will 
consider how these episodes fiscal in OECD countries are determined. 
3.  The determination of Fiscal episodes in OECD Countries 
The choice of the approach to measure the fiscal episodes is a critical point when 
assessing their effects on Aid supplies.  
The empirical literature provides several definitions for timing fiscal contractions and 
stimuli (expansion) with most of them relying on the structural budget balance concept, the 
balance that results from intentional actions of policymakers.   
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Fiscal  episodes  (consolidations  and  stimuli)  result  from  the  attempts  of  the 
governments to change the budgetary position of the government: fiscal consolidations or 
stabilizations aim at adopting discretionary fiscal policies which cut budget deficits whilst 
fiscal stimuli consist of discretionary fiscal policy that increase budget deficits. To identify 
fiscal consolidation episodes, we need to compute a measure of fiscal impulse. The Fiscal 
Impulse  is  the  discretionary  change  in  budgetary  position  and  can  be  measured  as  the 
difference between the actual budgetary position and what would prevail under a benchmark 
cyclical situation (Alesina and Perotti, 1995a).  
As mentioned by Alesina and Perotti (1995a), the use of the discretionary changes in 
fiscal  policy  indicator  means  eliminating  from  the  budget  balance  two  components:  the 
interest  payments,  which  cannot  be  directly  influenced  by  government’s  policies  and  the 
cyclical component of the budget. 
The first adjustment implies the use of the primary surplus (or deficit), whilst the second 
correction  is  more  problematic.  This  is  why  there  exists  several  ways  on  the  empirical 
literature to deal with this issue: 
- one possibility is to ignore the existence of the cyclical component in the primary 
budget balance and consider the change in primary deficit as the measure of fiscal impulse.  
-the second option is to use the cyclically adjusted budget deficits provided by the 
OECD or the IMF that rely upon somewhat arbitrary measures of “potential output” and base 
years.  
- the last option is the one suggested by Blanchard (1993). This approach is more 
attractive to the extent that it does not require a measure of potential output for computing the 
primary  surplus  (deficit)  corrected  for  cyclical  components.  This  measure  consists  of 
calculating how the budget balance would be in a certain  year, if unemployment had not 
changed from the previous year: this cyclical adjustment is an attempt to eliminate from the 
budget balance, changes in taxes and transfers induced by changes in unemployment, when 
tax-transfers laws remained unchanged.  
Once  calculating  the  fiscal  impulse  measure,  we  need  a  rule  to  identify  the  fiscal 
episodes (fiscal consolidations and fiscal stimuli periods). The criteria used in the existing 
literature to identify these episodes differ slightly from paper to paper. In this paper, we apply 
the  original  Alesina  and  Perotti  (1995)’s  definitions,  re-employ  recently  in  Ardagna  and 
Alesina (2010) and also widely used in practice. According to those definitions,   
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-  “A period of fiscal adjustment is a year in which the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance improves by at least 1.5 percent of GDP”. 
-   “A period of fiscal stimulus is a year in which the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance deteriorates by at least 1.5 percent of GDP”. 
Accordingly,  we  use  the  episodes  of  fiscal  adjustments  and  stimuli  identified  by 
Ardagna and Alesina (2010) to examine their effects on aid efforts: the authors focus upon a 
sample of 21 OECD countries with data spanning over 1970-2007. The countries included in 
their sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland,  United  Kingdom,  and  United  States.  However,  in  our  database,  we  exclude 
“Greece and Switzerland” because these countries have significantly short panels, though our 
results do not change if we include them. 
 Relying on large changes in fiscal policy stance, especially on the reductions and 
increases of budget deficits, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) use the Blanchard (1993)’s indicator 
of fiscal impulse (changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance) to identify the fiscal 
episodes. Overall, they identify 107 periods of fiscal adjustments, 65 last only for one period, 
while the rest are multiperiods adjustments and 91 periods of fiscal stimuli with 52 lasting on 
year, the remaining are multiperiods. The table 2a and table 2b list respectively the episodes 
(years) of fiscal consolidation and fiscal stimuli identified by Alesina and Ardagna (2010).     
To  have  a  first  look  at  the  response  of  the  Aid  flows  to  the  episodes  (“before”, 
“during” and “after”) of fiscal consolidations and stimuli, we regress the “Aid variables” on 
dummy  indicators  for  periods  “before”,  “during”  and  “after”.    Thus,  we  estimate  the 
following equations: 
, 1 2 1 2 1 2 , i t i i t Aid Beforefa Beforefs EpFA EpFS Afterfa Afterfs α β β λ λ γ γ ε = + + + + + + +    
where  the  “Aid  variable”  is  alternatively  the  Net  Aid  disbursements  in  percent  of  GDP 
(ODA), the Net Aid disbursements in percent of GDP from which debt forgiveness in percent 
of GDP is excluded (ODARelief) and the Net Aid Transfers (Roodman 2009) in percent of 
GDP (NAT) (these “Aid” variables are described further in the section IV); i denotes the 
country’s index: i = 1,..,19 and t denotes the time period index: t= 1970,...,2007.  1 β , 2 β , 1 λ , 2 λ ,
1 γ , and 2 γ  are parameters to be estimated and  i α  are specific-country effects.  
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“Beforefa “ and “Beforefs” are dummy variables taking the value of “1” the year before the 
fiscal episode starts in a donor country and “0” otherwise, for respectively episodes of fiscal 
adjustments (consolidations) and stimuli (expansion). 
“Afterfa” and “Afterfs” are dummy variables that take the value of “1” the year after the last 
year of the fiscal episode in a donor country (i.e. for example, if a fiscal episode lasts 4 years, 
we associate the value “1” to the fifth year), and “0” otherwise for respectively episodes of 
fiscal adjustments (consolidations) and stimuli (expansion). 
“EpFA”  and  “EpFS”  are  the  variables  indicating  respectively  the  episodes  of  fiscal 
consolidations and fiscal stimuli.  
We use as estimation technique the panel fixed effects method
3. The results (in table 3 
of the Appendix) of the estimations indicate that one year after the fiscal consolidation, aid 
declines significantly, irrespective of the “Aid variable” used. For the other variables of the 
model, we do not find a significant effect; this may be because we have not controlled for 
other explanatory variables. However, it does not matter at this stage of the study, as the 
purpose here is to have a first idea of the effects of fiscal episodes on aid disbursements. The 
next section is devoted to the specification of the model.  
 
4.  Econometric Specification 
   
        4.1 The Model 
We  follow  a  general  approach  that  consists  of  estimating  some  version  of  the  following 
equation:   , , i t i it i it i t i t A X Z α β µ η ε = + + + +    (1) 
where i denotes the countries (i = 1,....., 19) and t denotes years (t = 1970, ......, 2007) and :  
   the dependent variable , , ( / ) i t i t A Aid GDP = denotes the total Aid flows (bilateral and 
multilateral) from the country i in year t. We use as our primarily dependent variable the net 
ODA disbursements of aid flows of each donor and for robustness check, both the Net ODA 
disbursements of aid flows net of debt forgiveness, in percent of GDP (ODARelief), and the 
Net Aid Transfers (NAT)’s measure of Roodman (2009), also as a percentage of GDP.  
                                                           
3Fixed effects model (FE) appears as the logical econometric specification for having a first 
look on the effect of fiscal consolidation variables on aid disbursements. The reasons are very 
simple: first, Fixed effects allow us to capture unmeasured state-invariant factors influencing 
aid in percent of GDP. Second, the countries in our sample constitute, in principle, the whole 
population of the donor countries, so it is appropriate to treat the individual effects as fixed 
rather than random.  
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The vector  , i t X represents the Fiscal Episodes variables and include: the episodes of fiscal 
consolidation, the size of the fiscal consolidation, the episodes of fiscal stimuli and the size of 
fiscal stimuli. These variables are included in all our regressions.  
 The vector  , i t Z  comprises two kind of time-varying control variables derived from the 
empirical literature:  
     - On one side, a set of time-varying control variables that are include in all regressions: the 
fiscal balance (in percent of GDP), the gross public debt as a percentage of GDP and the 
Output  gap.  These  variables  combined  to  the  fiscal  episodes  variables  form  our  baseline 
regression model.  
      - On the other side, a set of time-varying and non-varying control variables derived from 
the empirical literature are included once in the baseline model: the degree of trade openness; 
a variable capturing the ideological orientation of the government; the number of years since 
the fiscal consolidation has started in a donor country as well as its square; the number of 
years since the fiscal stimuli has started in a donor country as well as its square; the quality of 
bureaucracy; the quality of governance; the level of population; the real effective exchange 
rate; banking crises; the unemployment rate; the inflation rate; the cold war and the welfare 
state institutions. 
i µ   are  donor  fixed-effects  that  are  incorporated  in  the  model  to  capture  the 
heterogeneity among countries as well as the likely importance of unobservable correlated 
with the error term in determining aid flows. The use of fixed effects  i µ  in our regressions is 
dictated by several reasons: First, since our sample is composed of heterogeneous countries, 
there  are  likely  state-invariant  and  unmeasured  factors  correlated  with  the  error  term  in 
determining aid flows. 
Second, the number of time periods is significantly higher than the dimension of our panel. 
Moreover, our macro panel contains, in principle, most countries of interest (representing the 
whole population of the OECD donor countries), and thus, will not likely be a random sample 
from a much larger universe of countries.  
t η  are year dummies and are included in all specifications to account for common 
shocks to aid volume in any given year.  
The disturbance  , i t ε  is assumed to be i.i.d. (0,
2
ε σ ), that is, assumed not correlated with 




Should our supply equation of aid flows have a dynamic specification? 
Wildavsky  (1964)  points  out  that  current  year’s  spending  in  any  public  agency  is 
predominantly influenced by the budget of the previous year. Mosley (1984) reinforces this 
argument by stressing that it is particular true for aid agencies, since aid projects often run 
over several years, with financial flows being committed already in year one. 
To  explore  statistically  this  likely  dynamic  specification,  we  follow  the  procedure 
suggested by Maddala (1987) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982). This procedure described in 
the appendix, refers to a Wald test to study if the lagged dependent variables has a direct 
effect  on  the  dependent  variable,  apart  from  the  indirect  influence  generated  by  serial 
correlations of the errors. If this is the case, then the model is called “state-dependence” or 
“system dynamic” and if not, it is called “serial correlation” or “error dynamics”.  
To perform the test, we use two lags of the dependent variable because additional lags 
appear not significant. The results are presented in Table 8 and are further interpreted in the 
section V. Accordingly, we estimate the previous described model specification with two 
lagged dependent variables. While it is well-known that the fixed-effects estimator generate 
biased results in a dynamic panel, Nickell (1981) proves that this bias decreases in the number 
of time periods and approaches zero  as T (the  time period) approaches infinity  (the time 
dimension of the panel is large). Accordingly, as our time-dimension is T=38 and our cross-
section dimension is N= 19, we choose to work with the fixed effects. 
In the next section, we discuss the expected sign of the different regressors included in the 
model. 
   4.2 Discussion on the Expected signs of the variables 
Episodes of fiscal consolidations: During the episodes of large fiscal consolidation, 
governments tighten their budgets and reduce the high debt levels to make public finances 
sustainable. Therefore, we can expect governments to reduce several items of expenditure 
including spending on aid flows, despite their firm commitment to increase aid exports to 
recipient’s countries. However, as have mentioned Round and Odedokun (2004) - P306, since 
“aid can act as an immense foreign policy tool for donor governments, it is not a particular 
discretionary item in the budget”; thus, it may not be reduced even in deterioration of public 
finance  situations.  Although  this  argumentation  runs  contrary  to  the  expectation  of  a 
procyclical pattern of foreign aid (Hallet, 2009), we can also expect aid expenditures to be 
protected  during  the  episodes  of  fiscal  consolidation.  In  other  words,  large  Fiscal  
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consolidation  can  exert  a  positive  effect  on  aid  flows.  In  addition,  we  also  assume  the 
governments in face of several competing government expenditures to reduce several items, 
but  maintain  or  increase  aid  exports  for  strategic  or  geopolitical  reasons:  aid  could  be 
protected even when spending is being constrained (Round and Odedokun 2004). 
 
The Size of fiscal consolidation: the greater the size of tightening fiscal policy, the 
higher the effect on aid supply. However, in reference to the hypotheses mentioned above, the 
size of fiscal consolidation may be ambiguous as the effect may be positive or negative on aid 
supplies, depending on policymakers’ preferences. 
 
Episodes  of  fiscal  stimuli:  During  large  episodes  of  fiscal  stimuli  that  aim  to 
stimulate  the  domestic  activity,  aid  expenditures  may  decrease  (this  is  considered  as  a 
discretionary component that is cut in favour of social and investment spending), increase as 
the other discretionary components of expenditures, or it may neither increase nor decrease.    
 
Size of the fiscal stimuli: We expect a priori that a high level of the fiscal stimuli size 
will lead to a rise of aid expenditures. However, for the reasons mentioned above, the effect 
may be neutral or, aid supplies may even decrease. 
 
The Budget deficit and the public debt: As in Mosley (1985), Round and Odedokun 
(2004), Faini (2006) and Bertoli et al. (2008), we hypothesize that the cases of weaker fiscal 
position characterized by larger budget deficits and high levels of public debt, will ceteris 
paribus lead to the reduction in the level of discretionary spending, especially that of aid flows 
– because of strong pressures to reduce deficits and public debt and preserve scarce foreign 
currency.  In other  words, a healthy  fiscal position will be associated ceteris paribus with 
higher spending, including on Official Development Assistance. We also follow Bertoli et al. 
(2008) and hypothesize that “given the small volume of aid relative to GDP, it is the overall 
level of public expenditures rather than its allocation among different expenditures chapters 
that influences the volume of aid” (see also Faini, 2006).  
In contrast to these hypothesis and in accord with Bertoli et al. (2008), we can also 
assume  that  weak  budgetary  positions  –  or  significant  debt  overhang  may  not  have  a 
detrimental impact on foreign aid, provided that the governments adopts an accommodating 




Output  Gap:  The  effect  of  the  output  gap  (the  difference  between  the  maximum 
output  achievable  and  the  actual  level  of  output)  can  be  either  positive  or  negative  as  a 
positive output shock may not necessarily lead to higher aid expenditures. 
 
The Number of fiscal consolidation episodes: We introduce a counter variable (in 
replacement of the variable “Epfa”) (see also Dang et al. 2010 for the same procedure with 
regard  to  the  “banking  crisis  variable”)  in  our  model  to  capture  the  effects  of  fiscal 
consolidation: the “number of years of fiscal consolidation”. This variable records the number 
of years since the first year where a fiscal consolidation occurs, with the first year taking a 
value of “1” and the value “0” for all years subsequent to the fiscal consolidation end’s year. 
To allow the effect to diminish over time, we include this counter variable in both linear and 
square terms in the model. In other words, we expect a negative effect of the counter variable 
“number of years of fiscal consolidation” but a positive effect of its square terms.  
 
The Number of fiscal stimuli episodes: the construction of this variable follows the 
same  procedure  as  for  the  variable  “number  of  years  of  fiscal  consolidation”  with  the 
difference here being that this variable records the number of years since the first year of the 
occurrence of a fiscal stimulus. This variable takes the value of “1” for the first year, “2” for 
the second year,..etc, and the value “0” for all years subsequent to the fiscal stimuli end’s 
year. To allow the effect to diminish over time, we also include this counter variable in both 
linear and square terms in the model. In other words, we expect a positive, neutral or even a 
negative effect of this counter variable.  
 
    Openness degree: We follow the empirical literature on aid determinants (Boschini 
and Olofsgard 2007; Dang et al. 2009; Dustin Tingley, 2010 and Sam, 2011) and assume that 
donor countries relying more on trade may see foreign aid as a useful tool to promote trade 
and hence increase their aid effort. Thus, the measure of how exposed a country is to trade 
Openness is: (Exports + Imports)/GDP. 
 
Ideological Orientation of the government: The empirical literature on aid supplies 
has  posited  that  ceteris  paribus,  right-wing  regimes  in  donor  countries  exhibit  lower  aid 
supplies  compared  to  left-wing  governments.  However,  the  influence  of  government’s  
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ideological  orientation  (social-democrat  versus  libertarian-conservative)  on  aid  supplies 
remains not clear-cut on the basis of aggregate aid data. Indeed, conservative governments 
may  allocate  more  aid  to  promote  national  commercial  interests,  while  progressive 
governments provide a similar amount for altruistic reasons (Round and Odedokun 2004; 
Bertoli et al. 2008). 
 
Real Effective Exchange Rate: It is expected that a depreciation of the real exchange 
rate will improve the balance of payments and thus increase overseas development assistance.  
 
Unemployment: Beenstock (1980) and Mosley (1985) mention that unemployment is 
one of the most important explanatory variables apart from fiscal balance when explaining aid 
expenditures, as there may be obvious incentives to cut aid expenditures and redirect funds 
towards domestic expenditures in times of fiscal problems. Thus, we expect unemployment to 
reduce the level of aid supplied by the donors. 
 
The  quality  of  bureaucracy:  This  variable  captures  revisions  of  policy  when 
governments change. As a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy 
formulation and day-today administrative functions, a strong quality of bureaucracy should 
minimize  the  revision  of  policy  when  governments  change.  Therefore,  we  can  expect  a 
stronger quality of bureaucracy to be associated with a higher level of aid disbursements by 
donors.  
 
The quality of governance: It is another way of measuring the role of political factors 
on aid supplies. The quality of governance is a composite index of corruption in government, 
bureaucratic  quality,  and  the  rule  of  law.  We  expect  a  better  quality  of  governance  in  a 
donor’s country to be associated with higher aid supplies. 
 
Banking crises: As we have observed above, a banking crisis in a donor country is 
expected to lead to a reduction of aid flows irrespective of its effect on the other economic 
variables such as real GDP or government budget. Indeed according to Dang et al. (2010) 
Bank rescues and recapitalizations place massive new fiscal demands on the public sector; 
even if the government is eventually able to recoup many of the costs of these rescues through 




Inflation: Greater economic difficulties (for instance, a high level of inflation with its 
inducing  macroeconomic  instability  effects)  will  lead  to  lower  support  for  foreign  aid 
programs. Thus, we expect a negative effect of this variable on aid supplies. 
 
Real GDP per Capita: Aid over GDP is assumed to be a “superior good”, that is, the 
ratio of aid over GDP is expected to increase as the per capita income raises. 
 
Population: According to Round and Odedokun (2004), an increase in population size 
is likely to be associated with greater population heterogeneity, loss of social cohesion and 
ceteris paribus, declining willingness to redistribute. There is a support to this hypothesis to 
the  extent  that  within  the  DAC,  the  small  countries  –  such  as  the  Nordics  –  are  more 
homogeneous and cohesive and have for long maintained an altruist and progressive attitude 
towards foreign aid.    
 
  Cold:  This  variable  captures  certain  main  miscellaneous  qualitative  time-related 
factors  that  affect  aid  supplies.  Indeed,  the  empirical  literature  highlights  that  aid  has 
plummeted from the early 1990s due among others to the end of the cold war. Indeed, the 
emergence of Eastern European countries from the early 1990s creates a competition with the 
conventional  developing  countries  for  aid  and  provides  a  greater  freedom  to  donors  for 
reducing aid on the basis of concerns about governance issues, fact to which they had to turn a 
blind during a cold war era (see Round and Odedokun 2004; Hjertholm and White 2000).    
 
  Welfare institutions: Therien and Noel (2000) argue that the influence of partisanship 
is indirect and operates through other policies like social-democratic welfare state institutions 
and social spending. Hence, the influence of political parties is only cumulative and operates 
indirectly through welfare institutions: the strong welfare institutions best explain foreign aid 
spending  patterns.  However,  whereas  Therien  and  Noel  (2000)  argue  that  welfare  state 
institutions are relatively fixed, this argument has recently been disputed by scholars who find 
that the earlier measures are deceptively static (Allan and Scruggs, 2004). We follow Dustin 
Tingley (2010) and use the “generosity” measure of Scruggs (2006) which is a time-varying 
measure of state welfare institutions (changes in state welfare institutions).   
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5.  The Data and the econometric methodology 
5.1 The Data 
We  define  and  describe  here  the  “Aid  variable”  as  well  as  the  “fiscal  episodes 
variables” used in our model. The other explanatory variables are described in the table 4. The 
model is estimated on a sample of 19 countries, with data covering the period 1970-2007. 
Indeed,  as  previously  mentioned,  we  consider  the  entire  sample  of  Ardagna  and  Alesina 
(2010) but exclude “Greece and Switzerland” (see above for explanation).  
       5.1.1 The Dependent Variable: Aid data 
In the empirical literature on the determinants of aid flows, several indicators of aid 
effort have been used: whereas some authors have used “aid as a percentage of GDP” (for 
instance, Bertoli et al. 2008; Faini, 2006), few studies have relied on using as dependent 
variable the overall aid (for instance Boschini and Olofsgard, 2007, Dang et al. 2009) and 
others have resorted to the use of (log of) aid per capita (see for instance, Frot, 2009). 
For our main test, the dependent variable is net Aid flows data (as a percentage of 
GDP) which allows us to control for loans repayments. More particularly, we use the Net 
disbursements  of  Official  Development  Assistance  (ODA)’s  share  of  GDP.  The  latter 
comprises grants and loans with at least a grant’s element of 25%.  
We  then  check  for  the  robustness  of  our  main  results  by  considering  additional 
variables of Aid effort: the Net Aid disbursements minus debt forgiveness (ODARelief) and 
the Net Aid Transfers (NAT), described by Roodman, (2009)
4, both as a percentage of GDP. 
The  Net  Aid  Transfers  concept  subtracts  out  repayments  of  principal  as  well  as  interest 
payments and cancellation of non-ODA loans (aka debt relief). This variable more closely 
approximates the current budgetary outlays associated with ODA.  
5.1.2 The Fiscal Episodes Variables 
Episodes of Fiscal Consolidation (and Stimuli): We use the variables constructed by 
Ardagna and Alesina (2010) according to their definition of “episodes of fiscal adjustments 
and fiscal stimuli” (see above). These authors have focused on large changes of fiscal policy 
to identify the episodes of fiscal adjustments and stimuli of OECD Countries.  
                                                           
4 See Centre for Global Development and data described in Roodman (2006 and 2009).  
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The  previous  definition  selects  100  episodes  of  fiscal  consolidation  (13.8%  of  the 
observations in our sample) and 85 episodes of fiscal stimuli (11.8% of the observations in 
our sample) for 19 countries over the period 1970-2007.  
The Size of Fiscal consolidation (and Stimuli): We follow the empirical literature on 
fiscal episodes (that is, consolidation and stimulus) (see for example, Guichard, S. et al. 2007) 
and consider the size of fiscal consolidation (and Stimuli) as the change in the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance expressed in percent of GDP over the whole episode (last year of the 
episode  minus  the  year  before  it  starts).  It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  measure  of  the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance used here is the one computed by Ardagna and Alesina 
(2010).  
 
The Number of years since the fiscal consolidation (stimuli) has started in a donor 
country: these two variables are  constructed following Dang at al.  (2009)’s methodology 
related to banking crisis (see above for the description of these variables). 
5.2 The econometric methodology 
In this part, we discuss the econometric technique suitable for estimating the effects of 
fiscal episodes on aid supplies. Consider the model (1) described above. We first impose the 
restrictions that   i α α =  and  i β  =β , for i = 1,..., 19.   
Our baseline model specification is:  
, 1 2 3 4 1 2
3 ,
i t it it it it it
it i t i t
A epfa Sizetight epfs Sizeloose Govnetlend Pubdebt
Outputgap
α α α α β β
β µ η ε
= + + + + +
+ + + +
 (2) 
where  , i t A denotes  ODA,  ODARelief  or  NAT  variables  as  previously  defined;  EpFA  = 
Episodes  of  Fiscal  Consolidation  (Adjustment);  Sizetight  =  Size  of  fiscal  consolidation; 
EpFS  =  Episodes  of  Fiscal  Stimuli  (Expansion);  Sizeloose  =  Size  of  fiscal  expansion  or 
stimuli;  Govnetlend  =  General  government  fiscal  balances  (Total  Revenues  minus  Total 
Expenditures) in percent of GDP; Pubdebt = Gross Public Debt-to-GDP-ratio; Outputgap = 
the outputgap;  i µ  and  t η  are respectively country-specific  effects and temporal dummies as 
previously defined. 
The use of fixed effects estimator (LSDV estimator) raises several issues.  
-First, as the time dimension of our panel is large, there is likely serial correlation of errors 
(serial correlation for each individual through the time period), contemporaneous correlation  
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between individuals and heteroscedasticity in the model. These problems are addressed by the 
use of appropriate correction techniques as described below.  
-Second, as we have mentioned above, even if the fixed effects method is often recommended 
in  dynamic  panels  of  our  size  (because  the  lagged  dependent  variables  bias  become  less 
serious when T grows larger), there may still be a concern with regard to the inconsistency 
due  to  the  presence  of  fixed  effects  in  a  dynamic  panel.  The  econometric  literature  has 
proposed instrumental variable (IV) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators 
as an alternative to LSDV technique. However, the properties of these estimators hold only 
when  the  cross-section  dimension  (N)  is  sufficiently  high  (see  Arellano  and  Bond,  1991; 
Kiviet, 1995; and Judson and Owen, 1999), because these estimators may be severely biased 
and imprecise when N is low (this is the case in our study). However, we present the results 
obtained by the use of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) on the baseline regression. This method is supposed to generate 
consistent results (for N higher than T) in the presence of fixed effects and consists of using 
the values on the dependent variable and the independent variables lagged twice and more as 
instruments.  
Kiviet (1995, 1999) and Bun and Kiviet (2003) have shown by the use of Monte Carlo 
simulations  that  the  estimation  of  dynamic  models  with  panel  data  is  possible  on  small 
samples.  Indeed,  they  show  evidence  that  the  LSDVC  (Least  Square  Dummy  Variables 
Corrected) estimator is more efficient than the GMM on small samples (N is low). Bruno 
(2005b) has extended previous Monte Carlo findings to the case of unbalanced panel data. 
Based on a strictly exogenous rule, he uses Monte Carlo simulations and both the bias and 
root  mean  squares  error  (RMSE)  criterion  to  compare  three  LSDVC  estimators  (AH 
(Anderson  and  Hsiao,  1982),  AB  (Arellano  and  Bond,  1991)  or  BB  (Blundell  and 
Bond,1998)) to the uncorrected LSDV estimator. 
He concludes that the LSDVC estimator outperforms the others for samples with a 
comparatively small cross-section.  
As the time dimension of our panel is high (T= 38), and the size of our cross-section is 
small (N = 19), we choose to perform all our regressions using the LSDV estimator. We also 
check the robustness of our results by the use of the LSDVC
5 estimator (only on the baseline 
regression), and the GMM estimator. 
                                                           
5 The LSDVC estimator adapted for Unbalanced panels (which is our case) is implemented in 
Stata by Bruno (2004; 2005) and relies on the strong hypothesis that all regressors should be  
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Overall, we adopt the following procedure: 
-Firstly, we estimate our baseline model parameters using the LSDV estimator and 
correct the standard errors
6 using by the PCSEs (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) in order to 
take into account both the contemporaneous correlation and heteroscedasticity of the errors. If 
according to Maddala (1987)’s test, it is observed that the model is “state-dependent” with the 
two lagged dependent variables (as we include two lagged dependent variables in our model) 
or with only one of the lagged dependent variable, then we apply the LSDV along with the 
PCSEs  technique  (the  presence  of  the  lagged  dependent  variable  corrects  also  for  serial 
correlation in the model due to the high time dimension of our panel by including lagged error 
terms into the specification). If by contrast, the model is “serial correlated” with the two year 
lagged values of the dependent variable according to Maddala (1987)’s test, then we remove 
the lagged dependent variables from the model, correct the serial correlation using the Prais-
Winsten  estimator  (using  the  rhotype  correction  proposed  by  Stata)  and  perform  the 
regression using only the LSDV along with the PCSEs (for contemporaneous correlation of 
error’s correction). 
-Secondly, we will check whether the use of the LSDVC or GMM estimator leads to a 
significant change in our parameters of interest (that of “episode of fiscal consolidation and 
stimuli variables”). This check is performed only on the baseline regression depending on the 
Maddala (1987)’s test results
7. If there is no significant change in the parameters, we include 
additional control variables (mentioned above) and use the LSDV estimator along with the 
PCSEs (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) and/or the Prais-Winsten correction to test for the 
robustness of our coefficients of interest.  
-Thirdly,  recognize  that  the  previous  assumption  of  our  model  parameters’ 
homogeneity ( i α α =  and i β  =β  and, for i = 1,..., 19) is strong, we relax it by examining the 
variation across different groups of countries, and test to what extent the average effect varies 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
exogenous, not even weakly exogenous. This is why we use the LSDVC as an estimator for 
checking the robustness of our baseline equation results. 
6 Although the presence of the lagged dependent variables can deal with the serial correlation 
of errors, it doesn’t take into account the contemporaneous correlation of errors. 
7 If the test reveals the presence of a “state-dependence” in the dynamic specification, then, 
we  apply  the  LSDVC  and  the  GMM  estimators.  If  the  dynamic  specification  is  “error 
dynamics”, then we do not use the LSDVC and GMM estimators, but rather the he LSDV 
estimator along with the PCSEs (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) and the Prais-Winsten 
estimator.   
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according to the group of countries observed. Indeed, the average (common-mean) effects α  
obtained for the fiscal episodes variables (“epfa”, “epfs”, “Sizetight” and “sizeloose”) as well 
as for the parameters  β  in equation (2) may hide variations among donor countries. The 
supplies of aid budget reflect motives that go beyond the fiscal situations of the country and 
that  can  make  the  donors  not  reduce  their  aid  expenditure  during  fiscal  consolidation 
episodes.  This  may  explain,  as  we  have  shown  in  the  literature  review,  why  there  is  no 
empirical  consensus  on  the  effects  of  fiscal  variables  on  aid  supplies  by  OECD  DAC 
countries. Moreover, the aid allocation literature provides evidence of substantial variation 
among donor countries  in their motives for  allocating a  fixed aid budget across recipient 
countries (e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000; McGillivray 1989).  
This concern about the poolability of data doesn’t rely only on a theoretical basis, but 
is also rooted on statistical considerations. Pesaran and Smith (1995) have in fact shown that 
incorrectly pooling data may lead to inconsistent estimates if the model is dynamic.  
Therefore, we explore empirically the stability of our parameter estimates through two 
ways:  
First, we exclude each country in our sample one by one on the baseline regression in 
order to test whether or not the results depend on the set of included countries. 
Second, we choose to split our sample into 3 major groups (although recognizing that 
any splitting of our sample into sub-samples remains somewhat arbitrary) and estimate the 
baseline model over the whole period 1970-2007. This will allow us to check whether the 
magnitudes of the coefficients of interest are different from those obtained in the baseline 
regression over the full sample. The groups are then:    
-the group of European Countries (EU) composed of 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Netherlands,  New-Zealand,  Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.  
  -the  Group  of  7  countries  (G7):  Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  United 
Kingdom and United States (see also Round and Odedokun 2004 who also use this group of 
countries); 
  -the  Group  of  “Canada,  Denmark,  Netherlands,  Norway  and  Sweden”,  sometimes 
referred to as the “like minded donors” (Stokke 1989) - (see also Boschini and Olofsgard, 




6.   Evaluation of the estimation results 
In this section, we turn to the interpretation of the results stemming from performing 
our regressions (tables  6 to 10) by the use of  the  LSDV along  with the Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors (PCSEs) and/or the Prais-Winsten estimators, the Arellano and Bond (1991)’s 
GMM procedure as well as the LSDVC initialized the bias correction using the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) estimator (the LSDVC and the GMM estimators are used once on the baseline 
regression).  
Before starting the interpretation of the results, let us say few words about the data 
generating  process  underlying  our  different  specifications,  according  to  Maddala  (1987)’s 
test. 
As we can see from the results presented in the table 5, 
-the  model  on  the  full  sample  of  19  countries  and  that  on  the  sub-sample  of  EU 
countries display a “state-dependent” with both one and two  year lagged values of either 
ODA, ODARelief or NAT dependent variable.  
-the model on the G7 countries is “serial correlation” with both one and two year 
lagged values of either ODA, ODARelief or NAT dependent variable.  
-the model on the sub-sample of “Like-Minded Donors” countries is “state-dependent” 
only with one-year lagged values of ODA. However, with either the ODARelief or NAT 
dependent variable, it is “error dynamics” with both one and two year lagged values. 
Tables 6 reports alternative estimates of our model (full sample of 19 OECD DAC 
countries  over  the  period  1970-2007)  obtained  by  changing  the  variables  included  in  the 
vector  , i t x of  regressors  and/or  by  using  other  measures  of  aid  flows:  the  Net  aid 
disbursements  minus  the  debt  forgiveness  (ODARelief)  and  the  Net  Aid  Transfers  of 
Roodman  (2009).  Specifically,  this  table  includes  the  baseline  regressors  as  well  as  the 
additional variables to check the sensitivity of our coefficients of interest to the inclusion of 
additional regressors. 
Table 7 presents the results obtained from the fiscal episodes effects on aid supplies
8 
when we exclude each country in our sample one by one in order to test whether or not the 
results depend on the set of included countries.  
                                                           
8 Note that the regression is performed on the baseline regression, but we present only the 
results on our parameters of interest. Moreover, the other variables although not presented in 
the  table  display  overall  the  same  effects  as  in  the  table  9.  The  results  of  these  control 
variables can be obtained upon request.  
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Table 8 to 10 contain respectively results on the sub-samples EU, G7 and the “like-
minded Donor countries” over the period 1970-2007. 
We will not discuss the results of each model specification one by one, but we will 
rather provide an overview of each regressor’s parameter by assessing whether they are robust 
and  consistent  with  the  expectations  presented  above.  We  will  particularly  focus  on  our 
variables of interest (“the episodes of fiscal consolidation”, “the episodes of fiscal expansion”, 
the “size of fiscal consolidation” and the “size of fiscal stimuli”). 
On the full sample, we observe that irrespective of the measure of “aid variable” used, 
aid supplies decline during the episodes of fiscal consolidation: over the period 1970-2007, 
aid generosity decreases by a value that fluctuates on average between 0.0178 percent of GDP 
and 0.0275 percent of GDP during the episodes of fiscal retrenchment compared to the years 
of absence of fiscal adjustments. Over the same period, a one percent increase in the size of 
the fiscal consolidation leads to a decline of aid expenditures by a value that swings between 
0.44% of GDP and 0.578% of GDP: this effect is observed for “ODA” variable, but not for 
“ODARelief” and “NAT” variables. Whereas a positive effect is obtained for large fiscal 
stimuli episodes on “ODARelief” and “NAT” variables, we do not find a significant effect for 
“ODA” variable, though the sign appears to be positive. However, the effect of the size of 
loose fiscal policy usually appears with negative sign, but is significant only for “ODARelief” 
and “NAT” variables when the LSDVC estimator is used. This suggests for these particular 
figures a conflicting effect of the episodes of large loose fiscal policy and the size of these 
policies on aid exports.  
In addition, the use of the counter variables described above leads us to conclude that: 
- a one more year of fiscal consolidation leads to a fall of ODA effort by 0.0297% of 
GDP, a decline in ODARelief effort by 0.0178% of GDP. However, no significant effect on 
“NAT” variable is observed. All these effects appear not to decrease over time. 
- a one more year of fiscal stimuli leads to a rise of ODARelief effort by 0.0232% of 
GDP, an increase of NAT expenditures by 0.0178% of GDP, and not affect significantly the 
“ODA” variable. However, these effects seem to decrease after approximately1.08 years for 
both the “ODARelief” effort and the “NAT” effort. 
The table 6 also suggests that our coefficients of interest (that is the effects of “fiscal 
episodes”  on  aid  flows)  remain  roughly  stable  and  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  additional 
explanatory variables. The latter exhibit the expected sign in the regressions performed.        
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            In accord with Round and Odedokun (2004) and Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) and 
in contrast with Bertoli et al. (2008), Faini (2006) and Mosley (1985), the parameter of the 
fiscal surplus in percent of GDP is not statistically significant in almost all specifications 
except two of them where it exhibits a negative sign. This suggests the absence of a fiscal 
balance effect on the level of foreign aid.  
             The  coefficient  on  public  debt  exhibits  alternating  significant  and  non  significant 
negative effects on aid supplies. The output gap appears to also exert alternating positive 
significant and non-significant effect on aid supplies.  
What  about  now  the  results  of  the  “Country  excluded”?  We  find  evidence  for  “ODA” 
dependent  variable  that  during  years  of  fiscal  consolidation,  donor  countries  reduced 
significantly aid flows compared to years characterized by an absence of fiscal adjustment 
with  the  magnitudes  remaining  the  same  as  the  ones  previously  obtained.  The  same 
conclusion applies to the size of fiscal expansion.  
             The fiscal expansion variables, namely fiscal stimuli episodes and the size of fiscal 
stimuli episodes exhibit different patterns with regard to their effect on aid effort depending 
on the “Aid variable” considered. Indeed, there is no significant effect of these variables on 
“ODA”; for “ODARelief” variable, fiscal stimuli episodes exert a significant (positive) effect 
only  when  Portugal  is  excluded  from  the  sample  whereas  the  size  of  these  fiscal  stimuli 
appears to be significant (and negative) only when Sweden is excluded from the sample. The 
effect of fiscal stimuli episodes on “NAT” variable is significant (and positive) in four cases 
of country’s exclusion from the sample (Australia, Italy, Japan, Sweden and United Kingdom) 
and insignificant in the other cases. However, the size of fiscal stimuli exerts an insignificant 
effect on “NAT” variable, except the case where Sweden is excluded from the sample (in this 
case, the effect is negative and significant). Overall, we can conclude that, apart from the 
exceptions cases, the results are stable and robust to the exclusion of each country from the 
sample. 
             Let us now turn to the results obtained on the Sub-Samples’ countries. The results of 
the baseline model reported in table 8 for EU countries are broadly in line with those found 
previously on the full sample. An average significant and negative effect is found for the 
episodes of fiscal consolidation on aid expenditures, irrespective of the “aid variable” used, 
whereas fiscal loose episodes exert positive and significant effect on the “ODARelief” and 
“NAT” variables (the “epfs” effect on “ODA” is not significant). However, neither the size of  
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the fiscal consolidation, nor the size of fiscal stimuli affects significantly aid supplied by EU 
countries.  
The  number  of  fiscal  consolidation’s  years  affects  negatively  and  significantly  only  the 
“ODA”  effort  of  EU  countries,  but  no  significant  effect  is  observed  for  the  other  “Aid 
variables”.  Furthermore,  this  effect  doesn’t  decrease  over  time.  Except  for  the  “ODA” 
variable where do not find a significant effect for the number of years of fiscal stimuli in EU 
DAC  countries,  we  find  evidence  of  positive  and  significant  effect  on  “ODARelief”  and 
“NAT” variables, with these effects decreasing over time.     
          What about the G7 donor countries? For this sub-group of countries, it is only the size 
of fiscal consolidation that, among the fiscal episodes variables, affects negatively the aid 
effort for all three aid variables. The magnitude of this effect is slightly higher than in the case 
of full sample or EU countries. This result suggests that despite the wealth and their lead on 
renewal  of  aid  commitments,  episodes  of  fiscal  consolidation  hit  severely  aid  supplies. 
However,  in  contrast  with  EU’s  sub-sample,  neither  the  counter  variables  of  fiscal 
consolidation nor those of fiscal loose affect the aid effort of G7 countries. 
          The results obtained for the Sub-Sample of the five “Like-minded Donor countries” 
depart clearly from the previous ones: whereas the “epfa” variable affect significantly only the 
“ODA” variable (negative effect) with a magnitude doubling that of EU’s sub-sample, “epfs” 
variable affects significantly only the “ODARelief” and the “NAT” variables (with positive 
effects). Note that these positive effects also double those of the EU’s countries.   
           With  regard  to  the  counter  variables,  it  is  observed  a  significant  negative  and 
decreasing effect of the number of large tight fiscal policy’s years only on “ODA” variable 
supplied by the five “Like-minded Donor countries”. Once again, the  magnitude of these 
effects is also higher than those obtained for EU’s countries. The effect of the number of years 
of fiscal stimuli is also positive and significant, irrespective of the “Aid variable” used, and 
decreases over time. The magnitude here is once again higher than that obtained for the EU’s 
sub-sample.  
            Overall, with regard to our variables of interest, we observe at least an effect of one 
fiscal  episodes  variables  on  “Aid  variables”,  irrespective  of  the  sample  used.  Even  if  the 
magnitude of the effects varies with the type of “aid variable” considered, it remains that the 
effects of fiscal consolidation and that of fiscal loose policies are respectively negative and 
positive on aid supplies, with sometimes a decreasing over time. Where the size of fiscal  
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consolidation or that of fiscal stimuli appears to affect significantly the aid effort of DAC 
countries (regardless of the sample considered), the effect is always negative.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze the behavior of OECD donor countries with respect to their 
aid effort during the fiscal episodes (episodes of fiscal consolidation and episodes of fiscal 
stimuli). The focus here is on a panel of 19 OECD DAC countries over the period 1970-2007. 
We use descriptive statistics provided by Alesina and Ardagna (2010) on fiscal episodes in 
OECD countries and regression models to perform this analysis. 
We  find  strong  empirical  evidence  that,  taking  the  full  sample  of  19  countries, 
irrespective of the effects of the stock of public debt, the fiscal balance and the output gap, the 
population  as  well  as  other  explanatory  variables,  aid  expenditures  are  severely  curtailed 
during episodes of fiscal consolidation by the donors, with this effect not diminishing over 
time.  However,  whereas  the  “ODARelief”  and  “NAT”  supplied  by  the  DAC  countries 
increase during years of large fiscal stimuli, no significant effect is found for “ODA” variable.  
In  addition,  the  higher  the  size  of  fiscal  consolidation,  the  lower  the  overseas 
development assistance disbursed by OECD donors. When the effect of large loose fiscal 
policy’s size is significant, the parameter appears to be negative. 
In order to check the stability of the parameters of our estimates, we split our sample 
in three groups: the European Union Group, the Group of the 7 richest countries and the 
Group of “like minded countries”: Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.  
 For the EU sub-sample countries, we observe the same pattern of the effect of our interest 
variables. By contrast, in G7 countries, it is only the size of fiscal consolidation that matters 
for aid supplies, with a negative effect. In contrast with EU’s sub-sample, we observe that 
neither the counter variables of fiscal consolidation nor those of fiscal loose affect the aid 
effort of G7 countries. 
          The results obtained for the sub-Sample of the five “Like-minded Donor countries” 
depart  clearly  from  the  previous  ones:  whereas  the  episodes  of  fiscal  retrenchment  affect 
significantly only the “ODA” variable (with negative effect) with a magnitude doubling that 
of EU’s sub-sample, the episodes of fiscal stimuli affects significantly only the “ODARelief” 
and  the  “NAT”  variables  (with  positive  effects).  We  also  note  that  these  positive  effects 
double those of the EU’s countries.  The counter variables also affect the aid effort of the  
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“Like-minded Donor countries”: we observe a significant negative and decreasing effect of 
the  number  of  large  tight  fiscal  policy’s  years  only  on  “ODA”  variable.  Once  again,  the 
magnitudes of these effects are also higher than those obtained for EU’s countries. The effect 
of the number of years of fiscal stimuli is also positive and significant, irrespective of the 
“Aid variable” used, and decreases over time. The magnitude here remains higher than that 
obtained for the EU’s sub-sample. Overall, this study provides evidence that during episodes 
of fiscal retrenchment, aid effort decreases severely, whereas it can increase during years of 
large fiscal stimuli. The effect of the latter could be reduced since the size of loose fiscal 
stimuli appears to affect negatively aid supplies.  
Based  on  these  results,  we  can  infer  that  the  fiscal  adjustment  measures  being  currently 
adopted by many developed countries will affect their aid expenditures, with these effects 
being  likely  higher  in  the  “Like-minded  Donor  countries”.  This  is  proved  by  the 
announcement in 2010 by the OECD that aid to Africa will be curtailed. These curtailments 
will affect severely the investment spending of developing countries, especially Africans with 
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APPENDIX 1: Tables  
Table 1: Average Aid Supplies during the period 1970-2007 by OECD DAC Countries 
Country  Average ODA to GNI 
Ratio over 1970-2007  
Average ODARelief to 
GNI Ratio over 1970-
2007 
Average NAT to GNI 
Ratio over 1970-2007 
Australia  0.32  0.32  0.32 
Austria  0.22  0.19  0.19 
Belgium  0.45  0.43  0.43 
Canada  0.37  0.36  0.36 
Denmark  0.75  0.73  0.73 
Finland  0.32  0.31  0.31 
France  0.52  0.47  0.43 
Germany  0.33  0.29  0.31 
Ireland  0.17  0.17  0.19 
Italy  0.19  0.18  0.18 
Japan  0.26  0.22  0.25 
Netherlands  0.79  0.74  0.76 
New Zealand  0.25  0.25  0.25 
Norway  0.78  0.77  0.78 
Portugal  0.13  0.11  0.16 
Spain  0.14  0.13  0.17 
Sweden  0.75  0.73  0.73 
United Kingdom  0.35  0.32  0.33 
United States  0.19  0.17  0.18 
 
Table 2a: The Episodes of fiscal adjustments identified by Ardagna and Alesina (2010)  
Australia  1987 1988 
Austria  1984 1996 1997 2005 
Belgium  1982 1984 1987 2006 
Canada  1981 1986 1987 1995 1996 1997 
Denmark  1983 1984 1985 1986 2005 
Finland  1973 1976 1981 1984 1988 1994 1996 1998 2000 
France  1979 1996 
Germany   1996 2000 
Greece  1976 1986 1991 1994 1996 2005 2006 
Ireland  1976 1984 1987 1988 1989 2000 
Italy   1976 1980 1982 1990 1991 1992 1997 2007 
Japan  1984 1999 2001 2006 
Netherlands  1972 1973 1983 1988 1991 1993 1996 
New Zealand  1987 1989 1993 1994 2000 
Norway  1979 1980 1983 1989 1996 2000 2004 2005 
Portugal  1982 1983 1986 1988 1992 1995 2002 2006 
Spain  1986 1987 1994 1996 
Sweden  1981 1983 1984 1986 1987 1994 1996 1997 2004 




Table 2b: The Episodes of fiscal Stimuli identified by Ardagna and Alesina (2010)  
 
Australia  1990 1991 
Austria  1975 2004 
Belgium  1975 1981 2005 
Canada  1975 1982 1991 2001 
Denmark  1974 1975 1980 1981 1982 
Finland  1978 1982 1983 1987 1990 1991 1992 2001 2003 
France  1975 1981 1992 1993 2002 
Germany   1995 2001 
Greece  1981 1985 1989 1995 2001 
Ireland  1974 1975 1978 2001 2007 
Italy   1972 1975 1981 2001 
Japan  1975 1993 1998 2005 2007 
Netherlands  1975 1980 1995 2001 2002 
New Zealand  1988 
Norway  1974 1976 1977 1986 1987 1991 1998 2002 2007 
Portugal  1978 1985 1993 2005 
Spain  1981 1982 1993 
Sweden  1974 1977 1979 1980 1991 1992 2001 2002 
United  1971 1972 1973 1990 1991 1992 2001 2002 2003 
United States  2002 
 
Table 3: Fixed effects panel data estimates of the response of aid flows to fiscal episodes 
  Model with “ODA” 
variable 
Model with “ODARelief” 
variable 
Model with “NAT” 
variable 
Estimator  Fixed Effects (LSDV with PCSEs 
and Prais-Winsten Corrections 
of standard-errors) 
Fixed Effects (LSDV with PCSEs 
and Prais-Winsten Corrections of 
standard-errors) 
Fixed Effects (LSDV with PCSEs 
and Prais-Winsten Corrections 
of standard-errors) 
Variable       
       
Beforefa  -0.00200  -5.53e-05  0.00191 
  (0.00715)  (0.00740)  (0.00671) 
EpFA  -0.0127  -0.0129  -0.00879 
  (0.00851)  (0.00876)  (0.00799) 
Afterefa  -0.0156**  -0.0154**  -0.0123* 
  (0.00714)  (0.00740)  (0.00672) 
Beforefs  0.000634  -0.00236  -0.0103 
  (0.00750)  (0.00790)  (0.00721) 
EpFS  0.00596  0.00965  0.00543 
  (0.00895)  (0.00924)  (0.00837) 
Afterefs  0.0113  0.00240  9.57e-05 
  (0.00774)  (0.00802)  (0.00743) 
Constant  0.231***  0.381***  0.228*** 
  (0.0474)  (0.0442)  (0.0432) 
       
Countries - Obs  19-653  19-645  19-653 
R-squared  0.683  0.805  0.829 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are standard errors of the coefficients; ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 4: Description of variables and Sources 
 
ODA = Net Official Development Assistance disbursed by each donor, in percent of GDP. 
This  variable  includes  ODA  to  multilateral  institutions.  Source:  Development  Assistance 
Committee (DAC) Databases; OECD (2010). 
 
ODARelief  =  Net  Official  Development  Assistance  disbursed  by  each  donor  minus  debt 
forgiveness,  in  percent  of  GDP.  This  variable  includes  ODA  to  multilateral  institutions. 
Source: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Databases; OECD (2010). 
 
NAT = Net Aid Transfers disbursed by each donor, as a percentage of GDP. This variable 
includes  transfers  to  multilateral  institutions.  Source:  Development  Assistance  Committee 
(DAC) Databases; OECD (2010). 
 
EpFA  =  Episodes  of  Fiscal  Consolidation  (Adjustment).  Source:  Alesina  and  Ardagna., 
2010, “Large Changes in fiscal policy: taxes versus spending”, NBER Working Paper No. 
15438, Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 24 – Appendix Table A1. 
 
EpFS = Episodes of Fiscal Stimuli (Expansion). Source: Alesina and Ardagna., 2010, “Large 
Changes  in  fiscal  policy:  taxes  versus  spending”,  NBER  Working  Paper  No.  15438,  Tax 
Policy and the Economy, Volume 24 – Appendix Table A1. 
 
Sizetight = Size of fiscal consolidation (adjustment). Source: Calculated by the author using 
the  Cyclically  adjusted  primary  balance  computed  by  Ardagna  and  Alesina  (2010)  with 
Blanchard’s method. 
Sizeloose = Size of fiscal stimuli (expansion). Source: Calculated by the author using the 
Cyclically  adjusted  primary  balance  computed  by  Ardagna  and  Alesina  (2010)  with 
Blanchard’s method. 
Numbertight = the Number of years since the fiscal consolidation has started in a donor 
country, with the first year of the fiscal consolidation taking a value of 1. Source: Calculated 
by the author using the Episodes of Fiscal Adjustment identified by Ardagna and Alesina 
(2010). 
Numbertightsq = the square of “Numbertight”. Source: Calculated by the author using the 
Episodes of Fiscal Adjustment identified by Ardagna and Alesina (2010). 
Numberloose = the Number of years since the fiscal stimuli has started in a donor country, 
with the first year of the fiscal consolidation taking a value of 1. Source: Calculated by the 
author using the Episodes of Fiscal Stimuli identified by Ardagna and Alesina (2010). 
Numberloosesq = the square of “Numberloose”. Source: Calculated by the author using the 
Episodes of Fiscal Stimuli identified by Ardagna and Alesina (2010).  
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Lrgdp = Natural Logarithm of the Real GDP per capita 2005 constant prices in US Dollars. 
Source: Pen World Tables (PWT 6.3), 2009. 
Pubdebt  =  Gross  Public  Debt-to-GDP-ratio.  Source:  The  International  Monetary  Fund 
(IMF)’s New comprehensive database on Public debt – (November 2010). 
Govnetlend  =  General  government  fiscal  balances  (Total  Revenues  minus  Total 
Expenditures)  in  percent  of  GDP.  Source:  OECD  Economic  Outlook  N°  88  –  December 
2010. 
Bureaucracy  =  Quality  of  bureaucracy.  This  variable  is  used  here  on  a  4-point  scale. 
Indeed, the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that 
tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are 
given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without 
drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. Conversely, countries that 
lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in 
government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-today administrative 
functions. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data. 
Icrg_qog = Quality of Governance: The quality of governance is measured by subjective 
indices from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The quality-of-governance index 
from ICRG used here is an 18-point scale, created by summing the following three six-point 
scales: corruption in government, bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law (see the ICRG for 
the criteria used in coding these measures). Regarding corruption and bureaucratic quality, the 
rationale  is  obvious.  The  rule-of-law  definition  indicates  that  this  measure  reflects  the 
government's administrative capacity in enforcing the law, as well as the potential for rent-
seeking  associated  with  weak  legal  systems  and  insecure  property  rights.  Source: 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data. 
REER = Real effective exchange rates based on consumer price indices - Year 2005 = 100; 
An increase denotes a depreciation. Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 88 – December 
2010. 
Unemployment  =  Unemployment  Rate  (in  %  of  Total  Labor  Force).  Source:  OECD 
Economic Outlook N° 88 – December 2010. 
Bankingcrises = Banking Crises – It is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the 
years of banking crises et 0 otherwise. Source: Data provided by Luc Laeven and Fabian 
Valencia (June 2010) – Website: http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm 
Inflation = Inflation rate, consumer prices (annual %). Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 
88 – December 2010. 
Trade = Openness degree to trade = (Export + Imports)/GDP. Source: OECD Economic 
Outlook N° 88 – December 2010.  
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Outputgap = Output Gap = the difference between the maximum output achievable and the 
actual level of output. Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 88 – December 2010. 
Cold = This is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" for years before or equal to 1990 
and "0" after 1990. Source: Author’s Calculation. 
Lpop = Natural logarithm of the level of population. Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 
88 – December 2010. 
Elec = Election Year - 1970-2008: The variable “Yearbeforeelec” is a dummy that captures 
one  yearbefore  the  election.  The  variable  Ybelecepfa  =  Yearbeforeelec  *  epfa  -  Source: 





PoliticalOrientation  =  Political  Orientation  variable  =    {0}  if  there  is  equality  in  the 
combination of two of these three parties (for example 50% of Right Party and 50% of Left 
Party); {1} if the Right party dominates the government; = {2} if the Centre party dominates 
the government and {3} if the Left party dominates the government. Source: Constructed by 
the Author using the Database of Political Institutions available online from the World Bank 
(Beck et al., 2010). 
Welfareinst = the “generosity” measure of welfare state institutions. Source: Database of 




Table 5: Maddala (1987) test for “Aid” variables on the baseline equation 
  Test for  1 t ODA −   Test for  2 t ODA −   Test for  1 e t ODAr lief −   Test for  2 e t ODAr lief −   Test for  1 t NAT −   Test for  2 t NAT −  
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Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. 























  ODA  ODArelief  NAT  ODA  ODArelief  NAT  ODA  ODArelief  NAT  ODA  ODArelief  NAT 


















Regressors                         
Aidt-1  0.626***  0.571***  0.594***  0.834***  0.816***  0.830***  0.578***  0.553***  0.599***  0.625***  0.565***  0.593*** 
  (0.0476)  (0.0481)  (0.0468)  (0.0288)  (0.0334)  (0.0293)  (0.0896)  (0.0854)  (0.0858)  (0.0478)  (0.0481)  (0.0468) 
Aidt-2  0.179***  0.222***  0.217***        0.219***  0.250***  0.212**  0.181***  0.228***  0.220*** 
  (0.0465)  (0.0468)  (0.0457)        (0.0743)  (0.0665)  (0.0754)  (0.0465)  (0.0467)  (0.0456) 
Epfa  -0.0268***  -0.0215**  -0.0196**  -0.0230***  -0.0195**  -0.0177**  -0.0249***  -0.0202**  -0.0178**       
  (0.00788)  (0.00854)  (0.00781)  (0.00815)  (0.00898)  (0.00799)  (0.00789)  (0.00796)  (0.00756)       
Numbertight                    -0.0297***  -0.0178*  -0.0160 
                    (0.00969)  (0.0108)  (0.00979) 
Numbertightsq                    0.00502  -0.000225  4.32e-05 
                    (0.00397)  (0.00442)  (0.00404) 
Sizetight  -0.498**  -0.132  -0.145  -0.453*  -0.138  -0.129  -0.440**  -0.0931  -0.0959  -0.575**  -0.310  -0.278 
  (0.195)  (0.236)  (0.225)  (0.237)  (0.267)  (0.231)  (0.194)  (0.321)  (0.304)  (0.242)  (0.275)  (0.264) 
Epfs  0.000325  0.0135  0.0161  0.00629  0.0198**  0.0250*  0.00544  0.0184  0.0222*       
  (0.00997)  (0.0110)  (0.0105)  (0.0143)  (0.0100)  (0.0140)  (0.0140)  (0.0144)  (0.0118)       
Numberloose                    0.00533  0.0232*  0.0272** 
                    (0.0128)  (0.0139)  (0.0132) 
Numberloosesq                    -0.00532  -0.0107*  -0.0125** 
                    (0.00538)  (0.00582)  (0.00554) 
Sizeloose  -0.0586  -0.324  -0.352  -0.160  -0.480*  -0.516*  -0.107  -0.344  -0.392  0.117  -0.111  -0.104 
  (0.258)  (0.299)  (0.294)  (0.302)  (0.288)  (0.295)  (0.365)  (0.384)  (0.387)  (0.287)  (0.326)  (0.324) 
                                                           
9 The LSDVC regression is performed using Arellano and Bond’s estimator. 
10 The figures indicate the Wald test (P-Value). Note that the Sargan test indicates a P-Value = 0.21 and the test for second-order serial correlation indicates a P-value= 0.119. 
11 The figures indicate the Wald test (P-Value). Note that the Sargan test indicates a P-Value = 0.737 and the test for second-order serial correlation indicates a P-value= 0.304. 
12 The figures indicate the Wald test (P-Value). Note that the Sargan test indicates a P-Value = 0.977 and the test for second-order serial correlation indicates a P-value= 0.539.  
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Govnetlend  -0.000663  -0.000880  -0.000840  -0.000363  -0.000419  -0.000607  -0.000358  -0.000136  -0.000481  -0.000583  -0.000773  -0.000747 
  (0.000901)  (0.000939)  (0.000875)  (0.00132)  (0.00136)  (0.00130)  (0.000916)  (0.00109)  (0.000935)  (0.000894)  (0.000934)  (0.000868) 
Pubdebt  -0.000177  -0.000206*  -0.000263**  -0.000183  -0.000217  -0.000251*  -0.000218*  -0.000251**  -0.000284**  -0.000174  -0.000201*  -0.000254** 
  (0.000112)  (0.000116)  (0.000111)  (0.000154)  (0.000182)  (0.000151)  (0.000105)  (0.000107)  (0.000105)  (0.000112)  (0.000115)  (0.000110) 
Outputgap  0.00204  0.00281*  0.00222*  0.00193  0.00235  0.00225*  0.00261  0.00290  0.00271  0.00201  0.00289*  0.00232* 
  (0.00146)  (0.00153)  (0.00126)  (0.00128)  (0.00155)  (0.00125)  (0.00168)  (0.00193)  (0.00189)  (0.00146)  (0.00153)  (0.00125) 
Constant  0.106***  0.0869***  0.0819***              0.103***  0.0874***  0.0821*** 
  (0.0193)  (0.0193)  (0.0191)              (0.0192)  (0.0193)  (0.0190) 
                         
Countries - Obs  19-606  19-601  19-606  19-616  19-613  19-616  19-587  19-582  19-587  19-606  19-601  19-606 
Overall R
2  0.963  0.970  0.974              0.964  0.970  0.974 
Time and or Year 
Dummies 
Significance 
YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. 
LSDVC indicates Bruno (2005) bias correction. 
The regressor “Aid” denotes the “Aid variable” 
a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
b: The model is “state-dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is the presence of one or two year lagged values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation).  
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  ODA  ODA  ODA  ODA  ODA  ODA  ODA  ODA  ODA  ODA  ODA  ODA 
























Regressors                         
Aidt-1  0.569***  0.612***  0.626***  0.626***  0.610***  0.624***  0.625***  0.621***  0.575***  0.624***  0.615***  0.632*** 
  (0.0604)  (0.0477)  (0.0476)  (0.0475)  (0.0474)  (0.0476)  (0.0476)  (0.0474)  (0.0549)  (0.0477)  (0.0477)  (0.0512) 
Aidt-2  0.126**  0.164***  0.179***  0.181***  0.174***  0.172***  0.179***  0.182***  0.178***  0.183***  0.188***  0.141*** 
  (0.0598)  (0.0465)  (0.0465)  (0.0464)  (0.0460)  (0.0463)  (0.0465)  (0.0463)  (0.0536)  (0.0466)  (0.0466)  (0.0499) 
Epfa  -0.0243***  -0.0262***  -0.0268***  -0.0271***  -0.0254***  -0.0266***  -0.0269***  -0.0269***  -0.0275***  -0.0264***  -0.0217***  -0.0250*** 
  (0.00823)  (0.00783)  (0.00788)  (0.00787)  (0.00779)  (0.00789)  (0.00790)  (0.00789)  (0.00803)  (0.00791)  (0.00840)  (0.00798) 
Sizetight  -0.473**  -0.493**  -0.498**  -0.506***  -0.488**  -0.515***  -0.499**  -0.488**  -0.578***  -0.491**  -0.529***  -0.421** 
  (0.185)  (0.196)  (0.195)  (0.196)  (0.194)  (0.195)  (0.196)  (0.195)  (0.192)  (0.196)  (0.192)  (0.198) 
Epfs  0.00502  0.00194  0.000325  9.87e-05  0.000359  0.00137  0.000681  0.000912  0.000917  7.27e-05  9.55e-05  0.00606 
  (0.0116)  (0.00995)  (0.00997)  (0.00997)  (0.00991)  (0.00996)  (0.00998)  (0.00998)  (0.0110)  (0.00998)  (0.00991)  (0.0109) 
Sizeloose  -0.0724  -0.0691  -0.0586  -0.0574  -0.0919  -0.0672  -0.0601  -0.0637  -0.113  -0.0580  -0.0354  -0.0929 
  (0.285)  (0.257)  (0.258)  (0.258)  (0.254)  (0.257)  (0.259)  (0.257)  (0.279)  (0.258)  (0.258)  (0.273) 
Govnetlend  -0.00203*  -0.00112  -0.000663  -0.00100  -0.000916  -0.000657  -0.000725  -0.000561  -0.00181*  -0.000632  -0.000678  -0.00126 
  (0.00113)  (0.000919)  (0.000901)  (0.000936)  (0.000896)  (0.000899)  (0.000923)  (0.000903)  (0.00103)  (0.000893)  (0.000899)  (0.000973) 
Pubdebt  -0.000388**  -0.000274**  -0.000177  -0.000178  -0.000230**  -0.000171  -0.000176  -0.000173  -0.000373***  -0.000199*  -0.000179  -0.000211 
  (0.000151)  (0.000119)  (0.000112)  (0.000116)  (0.000115)  (0.000112)  (0.000113)  (0.000113)  (0.000143)  (0.000115)  (0.000113)  (0.000129) 
Outputgap  0.00319*  0.00239  0.00204  0.00175  0.00211  0.00210  0.00207  0.00198  0.00111  0.00188  0.00200  0.00114 
  (0.00183)  (0.00147)  (0.00146)  (0.00147)  (0.00145)  (0.00146)  (0.00146)  (0.00145)  (0.00184)  (0.00148)  (0.00146)  (0.00142) 
icrg_qog  0.121*                       
  (0.0622)                       
Lpop    -0.153***                     
    (0.0489)                     
Cold      0.0319*                   
      (0.0193)                   
Bankingcrises        -0.0182                 
        (0.0124)                  
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Reer          0.000724***               
          (0.000194)               
Inflation            -0.00117             
            (0.000956)             
Trade              0.000212           
              (0.000284)           
Political 
Orientation 
              -0.00228         
                (0.00256)         
Unemployment                  -0.00255*       
                  (0.00145)       
Lrgdp                    0.00659     
                    (0.0104)     
Yearbeforeelec                      0.00468   
                      (0.00496)   
Ybelecepfa                      -0.0200   
                      (0.0123)   
Welfareinst                        0.00378*** 
                        (0.00141) 
                         
Constant  -0.0240  2.617***  0.0498***  0.104***  0.0385  0.102***  0.0760***  0.0878***  0.128***    0.0805***   
  (0.0544)  (0.811)  (0.0164)  (0.0193)  (0.0257)  (0.0246)  (0.0200)  (0.0200)  (0.0216)    (0.0188)   
                         
Countries-Obs  19-445  19-606  19-606  19-606  19-606  19-606  19-606  19-606  19-497  19-606  19-606  17-464 
Overall R
2  0.967  0.963  0.963  0.963  0.964  0.964  0.963  0.963  0.966  0.963  0.964  0.972 
Time and or Year 
Dummies 
Significance 
YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. 
          The regressor “Aid” denotes the “Aid variable” 
         a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
        b: The model is “state-dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
       c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
      d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is the presence of one or two year lagged values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation).  
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on ODA 
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Effect of the Size of the 
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Effect of Fiscal 
Episodes on NAT 
Effect of the Size of the 
Fiscal Episodes on NAT 
























                         
Australia  -0.0254***  0.00303  -0.440**  -0.0747  -0.0197**  0.0168  -0.0564  -0.351  -0.0176**  0.0196*  -0.0687  -0.376 
  (0.00802)  (0.0101)  (0.198)  (0.259)  (0.00869)  (0.0112)  (0.239)  (0.300)  (0.00793)  (0.0107)  (0.228)  (0.295) 
Austria  -0.0307***  0.00169  -0.453**  -0.0576  -0.0237***  0.0133  -0.116  -0.301  -0.0209***  0.0157  -0.117  -0.334 
  (0.00781)  (0.01000)  (0.192)  (0.259)  (0.00864)  (0.0111)  (0.239)  (0.300)  (0.00790)  (0.0106)  (0.227)  (0.294) 
Belgium  -0.0279***  0.000453  -0.486**  -0.0828  -0.0228***  0.0126  -0.0925  -0.332  -0.0206***  0.0159  -0.117  -0.370 
  (0.00794)  (0.0101)  (0.197)  (0.261)  (0.00866)  (0.0112)  (0.241)  (0.301)  (0.00789)  (0.0107)  (0.230)  (0.297) 
Canada  -0.0264***  0.00289  -0.456**  -0.0764  -0.0200**  0.0137  -0.0527  -0.314  -0.0178**  0.0164  -0.0579  -0.341 
  (0.00840)  (0.0102)  (0.210)  (0.260)  (0.00906)  (0.0113)  (0.250)  (0.301)  (0.00827)  (0.0108)  (0.238)  (0.297) 
Denmark  -0.0262***  -8.14e-05  -0.573**  -0.0383  -0.0278***  0.0127  -0.570**  -0.256  -0.0256***  0.0151  -0.560**  -0.279 
  (0.00883)  (0.0104)  (0.254)  (0.273)  (0.00890)  (0.0112)  (0.257)  (0.306)  (0.00824)  (0.0107)  (0.251)  (0.302) 
Finland  -0.0259***  -0.00555  -0.446**  0.145  -0.0225***  0.00473  -0.0952  -0.0563  -0.0201**  0.00815  -0.117  -0.0929 
  (0.00809)  (0.0110)  (0.195)  (0.299)  (0.00872)  (0.0123)  (0.240)  (0.353)  (0.00795)  (0.0118)  (0.229)  (0.349) 
France  -0.0275***  -0.00455  -0.499**  -0.0215  -0.0223**  0.00959  -0.135  -0.292  -0.0208***  0.0157  -0.152  -0.376 
  (0.00800)  (0.0106)  (0.194)  (0.267)  (0.00872)  (0.0120)  (0.236)  (0.313)  (0.00792)  (0.0111)  (0.224)  (0.302) 
Germany  -0.0267***  0.000468  -0.481**  -0.0596  -0.0217**  0.0134  -0.115  -0.336  -0.0196**  0.0160  -0.127  -0.359 
  (0.00794)  (0.0100)  (0.203)  (0.270)  (0.00863)  (0.0111)  (0.245)  (0.312)  (0.00790)  (0.0106)  (0.234)  (0.308) 
Ireland  -0.0269***  0.000174  -0.547***  -0.0699  -0.0205**  0.0142  -0.141  -0.338  -0.0182**  0.0165  -0.146  -0.354 
  (0.00821)  (0.0101)  (0.208)  (0.261)  (0.00900)  (0.0111)  (0.256)  (0.302)  (0.00820)  (0.0106)  (0.243)  (0.298) 
Italy  -0.0256***  0.00215  -0.474**  0.00398  -0.0205**  0.0150  -0.109  -0.250  -0.0187**  0.0175*  -0.119  -0.280 
  (0.00836)  (0.0100)  (0.199)  (0.260)  (0.00912)  (0.0111)  (0.242)  (0.300)  (0.00828)  (0.0106)  (0.230)  (0.297) 
Japan  -0.0279***  0.00152  -0.489**  -0.104  -0.0229***  0.0170  -0.0961  -0.402  -0.0207***  0.0204*  -0.123  -0.448 
  (0.00808)  (0.0106)  (0.198)  (0.266)  (0.00874)  (0.0117)  (0.240)  (0.308)  (0.00797)  (0.0111)  (0.229)  (0.303) 
Netherlands  -0.0228***  0.000895  -0.495**  -0.104  -0.0155*  0.0155  -0.0962  -0.349  -0.0137*  0.0170  -0.103  -0.354 
  (0.00817)  (0.0102)  (0.200)  (0.265)  (0.00882)  (0.0112)  (0.242)  (0.306)  (0.00789)  (0.0107)  (0.227)  (0.300) 
New 
Zealand 
-0.0276***  0.000700  -0.514**  -0.0575  -0.0220**  0.0143  -0.138  -0.325  -0.0201**  0.0170  -0.154  -0.354 
  (0.00824)  (0.0101)  (0.200)  (0.259)  (0.00893)  (0.0111)  (0.242)  (0.299)  (0.00817)  (0.0106)  (0.231)  (0.294) 
Norway  -0.0290***  -0.00960  -0.622***  0.0883  -0.0239***  0.00523  -0.207  -0.226  -0.0225***  0.00888  -0.230  -0.260 
  (0.00799)  (0.0102)  (0.195)  (0.261)  (0.00873)  (0.0113)  (0.240)  (0.302)  (0.00795)  (0.0108)  (0.228)  (0.298)  
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Portugal  -0.0238***  0.00618  -0.440**  -0.0892  -0.0202**  0.0195*  -0.0742  -0.356  -0.0191**  0.0167  -0.0897  -0.343 
  (0.00766)  (0.00980)  (0.199)  (0.259)  (0.00830)  (0.0108)  (0.234)  (0.298)  (0.00828)  (0.0108)  (0.228)  (0.295) 
Spain  -0.0275***  0.000700  -0.499**  -0.0481  -0.0221**  0.0139  -0.121  -0.330  -0.0202**  0.0162  -0.139  -0.338 
  (0.00816)  (0.0102)  (0.200)  (0.262)  (0.00893)  (0.0111)  (0.243)  (0.299)  (0.00810)  (0.0108)  (0.231)  (0.302) 
Sweden  -0.0243***  0.00402  -0.569***  -0.356  -0.0181**  0.0156  -0.183  -0.625**  -0.0169**  0.0181*  -0.197  -0.667** 
  (0.00797)  (0.0102)  (0.195)  (0.264)  (0.00845)  (0.0109)  (0.235)  (0.294)  (0.00753)  (0.0100)  (0.219)  (0.281) 
United 
Kingdom 
-0.0300***  0.000663  -0.526***  -0.0468  -0.0242***  0.0164  -0.137  -0.380  -0.0223***  0.0199*  -0.142  -0.425 
  (0.00828)  (0.0108)  (0.199)  (0.283)  (0.00897)  (0.0121)  (0.243)  (0.335)  (0.00814)  (0.0115)  (0.230)  (0.328) 
United  -0.0265***  0.00150  -0.486**  -0.0670  -0.0220**  0.0133  -0.128  -0.314  -0.0203***  0.0156  -0.142  -0.340 
  (0.00793)  (0.0101)  (0.197)  (0.260)  (0.00859)  (0.0111)  (0.237)  (0.300)  (0.00785)  (0.0106)  (0.226)  (0.296) 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01.  
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  ODA  ODARelief  NAT  ODA  ODARelief  NAT 
Estimators  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs 
Variables             
Aidt-1  0.625***  0.567***  0.596***  0.624***  0.560***  0.594*** 
  (0.0527)  (0.0527)  (0.0512)  (0.0529)  (0.0526)  (0.0511) 
Aidt-2  0.166***  0.221***  0.214***  0.168***  0.227***  0.217*** 
  (0.0519)  (0.0522)  (0.0506)  (0.0518)  (0.0519)  (0.0503) 
Epfa  -0.0252***  -0.0193**  -0.0165*       
  (0.00887)  (0.00953)  (0.00866)       
Sizetight  -0.349  0.106  0.0868  -0.456*  -0.0903  -0.0887 
  (0.220)  (0.261)  (0.249)  (0.272)  (0.306)  (0.292) 
Epfs  0.00935  0.0213*  0.0247**       
  (0.0113)  (0.0125)  (0.0118)       
Sizeloose  -0.145  -0.410  -0.448  0.0167  -0.233  -0.225 
  (0.272)  (0.314)  (0.309)  (0.316)  (0.358)  (0.353) 
Govnetlend  -5.16e-05  8.01e-05  6.90e-06  2.22e-05  0.000163  6.15e-05 
  (0.00107)  (0.00113)  (0.00103)  (0.00106)  (0.00112)  (0.00102) 
Pubdebt  -0.000281*  -0.000309*  -0.000366**  -0.000270*  -0.000290*  -0.000339** 
  (0.000158)  (0.000167)  (0.000156)  (0.000159)  (0.000167)  (0.000156) 
Outputgap  0.00334*  0.00383**  0.00339**  0.00331*  0.00398**  0.00358** 
  (0.00174)  (0.00184)  (0.00150)  (0.00174)  (0.00184)  (0.00148) 
Numbertight        -0.0280**  -0.0146  -0.0115 
        (0.0110)  (0.0120)  (0.0108) 
Numbertightsq        0.00417  -0.00128  -0.00169 
        (0.00451)  (0.00494)  (0.00446) 
numberloose        0.0184  0.0348**  0.0402*** 
        (0.0146)  (0.0159)  (0.0150) 
Numberloosesq        -0.00878  -0.0134**  -0.0158** 
        (0.00605)  (0.00650)  (0.00616) 
Constant  0.0822***  0.0973***  0.0804***  0.0975***  0.0945***  0.0860*** 
  (0.0248)  (0.0271)  (0.0255)  (0.0261)  (0.0271)  (0.0249) 
             
Countries-Observations  15-462  15-457  15-462  15-462  15-457  15-462 
Overall R
2  0.965  0.973  0.976  0.966  0.973  0.977 
Time and or Year Dummies 
Significance 
YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. -   The regressor “Aid” denotes the “Aid variable” -  a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. -  b: The 
model is “state-dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent variable.-   c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. -       d: The model is “error 
dynamic” (that is the presence of one or two year lagged values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation).  
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  ODA  ODARelief  NAT  ODA  ODARelief  NAT 
Estimators  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs 
Regressors             
             
Epfa  0.00294  -0.00213  0.00595       
  (0.0101)  (0.0106)  (0.0105)       
Sizetight  -0.544**  -0.639**  -0.627**  -0.612*  -0.741**  -0.682** 
  (0.257)  (0.287)  (0.282)  (0.333)  (0.341)  (0.337) 
Epfs  -0.00566  0.00660  -0.000562       
  (0.0112)  (0.0114)  (0.0115)       
Sizeloose  -0.351  -0.426  -0.362  -0.108  -0.125  -0.0865 
  (0.304)  (0.317)  (0.302)  (0.345)  (0.361)  (0.352) 
Govnetlend  -0.00649***  -0.00671***  -0.00660***  -0.00545**  -0.00641***  -0.00625*** 
  (0.00230)  (0.00227)  (0.00211)  (0.00224)  (0.00230)  (0.00213) 
Pubdebt  0.000202  0.000212  -0.000296  0.000232  0.000242  -0.000258 
  (0.000309)  (0.000298)  (0.000254)  (0.000325)  (0.000294)  (0.000254) 
Outputgap  -0.000588  0.00215  0.00132  -0.00118  0.00197  0.00106 
  (0.00257)  (0.00263)  (0.00259)  (0.00205)  (0.00265)  (0.00260) 
Numbertight        -0.00347  -0.00650  0.00240 
        (0.0130)  (0.0133)  (0.0131) 
Numbertightsq        0.000557  0.000638  -0.000473 
        (0.00493)  (0.00506)  (0.00494) 
Numberloose        -0.0131  -0.000793  -0.0107 
        (0.0147)  (0.0143)  (0.0144) 
Numberloosesq        0.000458  -0.00248  0.000479 
        (0.00604)  (0.00607)  (0.00579) 
             
Constant  0.309***  0.156***  0.116**  0.168***  0.0632  0.459*** 
  (0.0385)  (0.0385)  (0.0452)  (0.0378)  (0.0460)  (0.0348) 
             
Countries-Observations  7-230  7-230  7-230  7-230  7-230  7-230 
Overall R
2  0.777  0.703  0.780  0.783  0.682  0.758 
Time and or Year Dummies 
Significance 
YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. - The regressor “Aid” denotes the “Aid variable” 
         a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. -   b: The model is “state-dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent   
variable. -  c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. -   d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is the presence of one or two year lagged 
values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation).  
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  ODA  ODARelief  NAT  ODA  ODARelief  NAT 
Estimators  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs  LSDV with PCSEs 
Variables             
             
Aidt-1  0.837***      0.834***     
  (0.0323)      (0.0310)     
Epfa  -0.0452***  -0.0141  -0.0112       
  (0.0125)  (0.0147)  (0.0149)       
Sizetight  -0.00530  0.253  0.282  0.311  -0.0899  -0.0566 
  (0.280)  (0.295)  (0.296)  (0.354)  (0.453)  (0.458) 
Epfs  0.0106  0.0428**  0.0423**       
  (0.0181)  (0.0193)  (0.0196)       
Sizeloose  0.192  -0.356  -0.404  1.389***  0.557  0.465 
  (0.449)  (0.452)  (0.464)  (0.461)  (0.582)  (0.601) 
Govnetlend  0.000140  -0.00505*  -0.00501*  -0.000954  -0.00557*  -0.00554* 
  (0.00160)  (0.00284)  (0.00286)  (0.00151)  (0.00293)  (0.00297) 
Pubdebt  5.58e-05  0.000566  0.000601  0.000141  0.000795*  0.000812* 
  (0.000271)  (0.000434)  (0.000438)  (0.000255)  (0.000446)  (0.000452) 
Outputgap  0.00155  0.00174  0.00216  0.00252  0.00233  0.00282 
  (0.00255)  (0.00435)  (0.00439)  (0.00242)  (0.00454)  (0.00459) 
Numbertight        -0.0547***  -0.0169  -0.0130 
        (0.0144)  (0.0182)  (0.0184) 
Numbertightsq        0.0156***  -0.00155  -0.00238 
        (0.00571)  (0.00791)  (0.00798) 
Numberloose        0.0488**  0.0582**  0.0568** 
        (0.0228)  (0.0258)  (0.0260) 
Numberloosesq        -0.0425***  -0.0345***  -0.0329** 
        (0.0104)  (0.0128)  (0.0129) 
Constant    0.352***  0.742***    0.516***  0.327*** 
    (0.0689)  (0.0708)    (0.0624)  (0.0697) 
             
Countries – Obs  5-172  5-172  5-172  5-172  5-172  5-172 
Overall R
2  0.970  0.940  0.935  0.977  0.924  0.915 
Time and /or Year Dummies Significance  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. 
              The regressor “Aid” denotes the “Aid variable”-  a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
            b: The model is “state-dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent variable.- c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent 
variable. -  d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is the presence of one or two year lagged values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation).  
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  Obs  Mean      Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Oda  722  .387875  .2486271  0  1.040209 
Odarelief  698  .3834206  .237751  .0123208  1.040209 
Nat  722  .3662615  .2445341  0  1.033615 
Epfa  653  .151608  .3589154  0  1 
Epfs  653  .1301685  .3367466  0  1 
Beforeepfa  653  .1163859  .320933  0  1 
Beforeepfs  704  .0909091  .2876842  0  1 
Afterepfs  706  .0906516  .2873165  0  1 
Numbertight  653  .194487  .519999  0  4 
Numbertightsq  653  .3078101  1.195037  0  16 
Numberloose  653  .1653905  .4734319  0  3 
Numberloosesq  653  .2511485  .9615392  0  9 
Sizetight  653  -.0036348  .0124179  -.1528607  0 
Sizeloose  653  .0034784  .0122828  0  .107214 
Govnetlend  690  -2.192955  4.329945  -16.00805  18.48245 
Pubdebtimf  712  52.32846  29.10584  0  191.6414 
Outputgap  644  -.1337252  2.141367  -8.722275  6.514374 
Icrgqog  456  .9006301  .0986974  .5231482  1 
Lpop  722  16.72196  1.261909  14.85225  19.52358 
Cold  722  .5526316  .4975669  0  1 
Bankingcrises  722  .0360111  .1864469  0  1 
Reer  718  97.74612  13.26922  48.33874  144.7275 
Inflation  700  5.809362  5.102501  -9.628535  28.78333 
Trade  722  62.57673  31.46253  11.25685  184.7421 
Politicalorientation  722  1.889197  .9719618  0  3 
Unemployment  499  7.641683  3.881486  1.6  23.9 
Lrgdp  722  10.10172  .4258751  8.500455  11.3186 
Elec  722  .3060942  .4611888  0  1 
Yearbeforeelec  722  .2880886  .4531865  0  1 




APPENDIX 2:  Description of Maddala (1987) Test   
Consider the following model:  , , 1 , i t i t i i t y y u β α − = + +   (1). Maddala (1987) suggests 
that an important issue that arises in dynamic models is that of “serial correlation” versus 
“state dependence”, that is, whether any direct effects of the dependent variable exist apart 
from those generate indirectly by the serial correlation of the errors. Alternative terminology 
for  the  “serial  correlation  model”  versus  “state-dependence  model”  is  model  with  “error 
dynamics” and “system dynamics”, respectively. To clarify this problem, consider a single 
cross-section unit where we drop the subscript I (this issue is not special to panel data and 
concerns  also  the  usual  regression  models  as  well).  For  example,  consider  the  regression 









 = + 
   
We can write it as   1 1 t t t t t y y x x e β β ρβ − − = + − +  (2). The model in (2) is the same as 
the  dynamic  regression  equation:  (3)  1 0 1 t t t t t y y x x e γ β ρβ − − = + − +   with  the  restriction
0 1 0 γβ β + = .  The  two  models  thus differ  in  this  restriction.  If  the  restriction  0 1 0 γβ β + =  
holds, the apparent effect of  1 t y − on  t y is due to serial correlation in the errors. On the other 
hand, if this restriction does not hold, then  1 t y −  has an effect on  t y  and we have what is 
known as « state-dependence ». Thus an estimate of Equation (3) and a test of the restriction 
0 1 0 γβ β + =  will enable us to discrimate between the “serial correlation model” and the “state 
dependence model”. 
Summing up, the proper procedure is to first estimate Equation (3) and test for the 
restriction 0 1 0 γβ β + = . If this is not rejected, then we test for serial correlation by testing
0 ρ = . Thus, the test for the serial correlation should be undertaken after we have determined 
that  what  we  have  is  perhaps  a  serial  correlation  model.  The  use  of  the  Durbin-Watson 
statistic at the beginning is not a correct procedure.  
Returning  to  the  case  of  panel  data,  the  “serial  correlation  model”  and  the  “state-
dependence model” corresponding to Equation (4):  
'
, , i t i t i it y x u β α = + +  are:  




i t i t i it





 = + + 

= +  
 ;     
The State dependence model:
'
, , 1 , i t i t i t i it y y x u ρ β α − − = + + . 